Born 1956, USA, US citizen
Married to Kristin Famulari McAfee, two children

1600 Amphitheatre Parkway
Mountain View, CA 94043
Working Papers
Advanced Lectures

Ph.D. (Economics) Purdue University, 1980
M.S. (Economics) Purdue University, 1978
M.S. (Mathematics) Purdue University, 1978
B.A. (Economics) University of Florida, 1976 (Highest Honors, Phi Beta Kappa)

Director, Google Strategic Technologies, 2012-
Chief Economist, VP and Research Fellow, Yahoo! Research, 2007-2012
J. Stanley Johnson Professor, California Institute of Technology, 2004-2009
Goh Keng Swee Visiting Professor, National University of Singapore, July 2007
Executive Officer for Social Science, California Institute of Technology, 2005-7
Visiting Professor, London Business School, July 2006
Visiting Professor, Universitat Autonoma Barcelona, July 2005
Murray S. Johnson Chair, University of Texas at Austin, 1997-2003
Visiting Professor of Business Strategy, University of Chicago GSB, 2000-2001
Chair, Department of Economics, University of Texas at Austin, 1997-8
Rex G. Baker, Jr.,
Professor of Political Economy, University of Texas at Austin, 1990-7
Visiting Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1994-5
Professor of Economics, University of Western Ontario, 1989-1990
Visiting Professor of Economics, California Institute of Technology, 1989-90
Visiting Associate Professor of Economics, California Institute of Technology, 1988-9
Associate Professor of Economics, University of Western Ontario, 1987-9
Assistant Professor of Economics, University of Western Ontario, 1981-7
Visiting Assistant Professor of Economics, Purdue University, 1980-1

Advisor, Rand Education, 2012-
Council Member, Game Theory Society, 2012-.
Founding Co-Editor, ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, 2011-
Member of the Board of Governors, Pardee Rand Graduate School, 2010-.
EC Program Chair, 2013.
EC Senior Program Committee, 2012.
EC Program Committee, 2010-11, 2014.
WWW Program Committee, 2014.
Editor, Economic Inquiry, 2007-12. Advisory Board, 2007-
Econometric Society Program Committee, Summer Meetings 2007.
AEA Editor Search Committee for American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2006.
Latin American Econometric Society Program Editor, 2006.
U.S. Senate Testimony and Report, Committee on the Judiciary, February 1, 2006.
Associate Editor, Theoretical Economics, 2005-9
Executive Board, Society for Economic Theory, 2005-9
Econometric Society Program Committee, 2005 North American Winter Meetings.
AEA Committee to Select the AER Editor, 2004.
Albany Symposium, 2003, keynote speaker
AEA Program Committee, 2004 Meetings.
U.S. Senate Testimony, May 2, 2002, Governmental Affairs Committee, Permanent Subcommitee on Investigations: text or 40MB video.
AEA Nominating Committee, 2002.
U.S. Senate Testimony, April 25, 2001, Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs, Foreign Commerce, and Tourism.
Colin Clark Lecture, Australasian Econometric Society Meetings, 1998.
Co-Founder, Market Design, Inc..
Co-Editor, American Economic Review, 1993-2002
Organized AEA session in honor of William Vickrey, 1992.
Associate Editor, American Economic Review, 1992-3, 2002-5.
Associate Editor, Journal of Economic Theory, 1992-6, 2002-4
Departmental Evaluations: IUPUI (1995), Duke (2002), U Maryland (2009, Chair), Iowa State (2011).

Distinguished Fellow of the Industrial Organization Society.
Sparc Innovator, 2009.
Honorary Doctorate in Economics, granted by Purdue University, May 10, 2008.
ASCIT Teaching Award for Mentoring, 2006.
John S. Day Distinguished Alumni Award, Purdue's Krannert School of Management, 1997.
Fellow (1995) and Member of the Econometric Society.

Major Clients: Airtouch, AMD, BMC Software, Cadence, US Department of Defense, Duke Energy, Enron, Federal Trade Commission (BP-Arco, Exxon-Mobil, Phillips-Conoco, Monster-Hot Jobs merger analyses, 2001 Midwest Gasoline Price Investigation, FTC v. Rambus, Decision), Government of Mexico, Government of Peru, Great Northern Nekoosa, Holly Corp, U.S. Department of Justice (Oracle-PeopleSoft merger), Lockheed-Martin, NGPL (Papers: Measuring Pipeline Concentration and Excess Capacity Effects), Pacific Telesys, Picker, Pioneer, PCS Primeco, Realty One, RSR Corp, Sabre, SBC, Telecom New Zealand, Travelocity.

  1. The Wisdom of Smaller, Smarter Crowds, EC 2014:Proceedings of the 15th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2014 (with Dan Goldstein and Sid Suri).
  2. Machine Learning in an Auction Environment, WWW 2014: Proceedings of the 23th International Conference on the World Wide Web, April 2014 (with Patrick Hummel).
  3. To Match or Not to Match: Economics of Cookie Matching in Online Advertising, Transactions in Economics and Computation, To Appear (with Arpita Ghosh, Mohammad Mahdian and Sergei Vassilvitskii).
  4. Maximally Representative Allocations for Guaranteed Delivery Advertising Campaigns, Review of Economic Design, Volume 17, Issue 2 (2013), 83-94 (with Kishore Papineni and Sergei Vassilvitskii).
  5. The Cost of Annoying Ads, WWW 2013: Proceedings of the 22th International Conference on the World Wide Web, April 2013 (with Dan Goldstein and Sid Suri).
  6. An Overview of Practical Exchange Design, Current Science, Special Issue on Game Theory, Volume 103, Issue 9, November 10, 2012 (with Sergei Vassilvitskii)
  7. To match or not to match: Economics of cookie matching in online advertising, Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2012 (with Mohammad Mahdian, Arpita Ghosh, and Sergei Vassilvitskii).
  8. Improving the Effectiveness of Time-Based Display Advertising, EC 2013: Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2012 (with Dan Goldstein and Sid Suri).
  9. Let the Punishment Fit the Crime: Externalities with Observational Error, forthcoming Journal of Public Economic Theory, (with Indranil Chakraborty).
  10. Crowdsourcing with Endogenous Entry, WWW 2012: Proceedings of the 21th International Conference on the World Wide Web, April 2012 (with Arpita Ghosh).
  11. Tradeoff of the Commons, Journal of Public Economics, Forthcoming (with Alan Miller).
  12. Split-Award Auctions with Investment, Journal of Public Economics, forthcoming, (with Jiong Gong and Jianpei Li).
  13. Efficient Ranking in Sponsored Search, Proceedings of the 7th international Workshop on Internet and Network Economics (WINE), 2011 (with Sebastien Lahaie).
  14. Comparing Predicted Prices in Auctions for Online Advertising, International Journal of Industrial Organization, forthcoming (with Eric Bax, Anand Kuratti, and Julian Romero).
  15. The Design of Advertising Exchanges, Review of Industrial Organization, Volume 39, Issue 3 (2011), Page 169-185.
  16. Who Moderates the Moderators? Crowdsourcing Abuse Detection in User-generated Content, EC 2011: Proceedings of the 12th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2011 (with Arpita Ghosh and Satyen Kale).
  17. The Effects of Exposure Time on Memory of Display Advertisements, EC 2011: Proceedings of the 12th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2011 (with Daniel Goldstein and Sid Suri).
  18. Incentivizing High Quality User Generated Content, WWW 2010: Proceedings of the 19th International Conference on the World Wide Web, March 2011 (with Arpita Ghosh).
  19. Cloud Control: Voluntary Admission Control for Intranet Traffic Management, Information Systems and e-Business Management Special Issue: 2009 Workshop on E-Business (with John Langford, Lihong Li, and Kishore Papenini).
  20. Value of Learning in Sponsored Search Auctions Proceedings of the 6th international Workshop on Internet and Network Economics (WINE), 2010. (with Sai-Ming Li and Mohammad Mahdian).
  21. La Transparencia Y Las Politicas Antimonopolicas El Trimestre Economico, Vol LXXVII num 306 Abril-Iunio de 2010, p 257-272.
  22. Bidding for Representative Allocations for Display Advertising Proceedings of the 5th international Workshop on Internet and Network Economics (WINE), 2009 (with Arpita Ghosh, Kishore Papineni, and Sergei Vassilvitskii).
  23. Firms, Queues and Coffeebreaks: A Flow Model of Corporate Activity with Delays Review of Economic Design, Volume 15, Issue 1 (2011), Page 59-?? (with Ben Golub).
  24. The Unintended Consequences of the Sarbannes Oxley Act of 2002, Research in Accounting Regulation 22, 18-28 (with Nicholas Vakkur and Fred Kipperman).
  25. License Prices with Financially Constrained Bidders, Journal of Regulatory Economics 36, 2009, 178-98, (with Roberto Burguet).
  26. Edifying Editing, The American Economist, Spring, 2010.
  27. The Secretary Problem with a Hazard Rate Condition, Proceedings of the 4th international Workshop on Internet and Network Economics (WINE), 2008 (with Mohammad Mahdian and David Pennock).
  28. Sharing Online Advertising Revenue with Consumers, Proceedings of the 4th international Workshop on Internet and Network Economics (WINE), 2008 (with Yiling Chen, Arpita Ghosh and David Pennock).
  29. A Theory of Bilateral Oligopoly, Economic Inquiry, Volume 48, Issue 2, April 2010, 391–414 (with Ken Hendricks).
  30. Private v. Public Antitrust Enforcement: A Strategic Analysis, Journal of Public Economics 92(10), Oct 2008, 1863-75 (with Hugo Mialon and Sue Mialon).
  31. Do Sunk Costs Matter?, Economic Inquiry, Volume 48, Issue 2, April 2010, 323–336 (with Hugo and Sue Mialon).
  32. Evaluating the Likely Competitive Effects of Horizontal and Vertical Mergers: A New Approach, Antitrust Report, (2007) Issue 2, pp. 33-40 (with Ken Hendricks and Michael Williams)
  33. The Role of Excess Capacity in Determining Market Power in Natural Gas Transportation Markets, Journal of Regulatory Economics, 32, 2007, 209-223 (with Philip Reny)
  34. Capacity Choice Counters the Coase Conjecture, Review of Economic Studies, 75, no. 1 (2008), 317-332 (with Tom Wiseman).
  35. The Gains from Trade Under Fixed Price Mechanisms, Applied Economics Research Bulletin, Vol 1, (Fall 2008).
  36. Dynamic Pricing with Constant Demand Elasticity Production and Operations Management, Special Issue on Revenue Management and Dynamic Pricing, Vol 17, number 4, July-August 2008 (with Vera te Velde).
  37. Interpreting Concentration Indices in the Secondary Market for Natural Gas Transportation: The Implication of Pipeline Residual Rights, Energy Economics, Volume 30, Issue 3, May 2008, 807-817 (with Michael Doane, Ashish Nayyar and Michael Williams).
  38. Signaling Character in Electoral Competition, American Economic Review, Vol. 97, No. 3, June 2007(with Navin Kartik).
  39. Does Large Price Discrimination Imply Great Market Power? Economics Letters, Vol. 92, No. 3, 360-367. (with Hugo Mialon and Sue Mialon)
  40. Feints, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 15 no. 2 (Summer 2006), 431 -56, (with Ken Hendricks).
  41. The Strategic Abuse of the Antitrust Laws, Journal of Strategic Management Education, Vol. 2, no. 1, 2005 (with Nicholas Vakkur).
  42. The Real Lesson of Enron's Implosion: The Trust Business, The Economists' Voice, Vol. 1: No. 2, Article 4.
  43. Barrieres a l'entree dans l'analyse antitrust, Revue Lamy de la concurrence: Droit, Economie, Regulation, No. 1, November 2004 (with Hugo Mialon), 155-7.
  44. Evaluating and Enhancing Competition in the Interstate Natural Gas Transportation Industry, Natural Resources Journal, 44, #3, Summer 2004 (with Michael Doane and Michael Williams).
  45. What is a Barrier to Entry? American Economic Review Paper and Proceedings, 94(2) May 2004, 461-5 (with Hugo Mialon and Michael Williams).
  46. How to Set Minimum Acceptable Bids, with Application to Real Estate Auctions, Journal of Industrial Economics, Volume L, No. 4 (December 2002) (with Daniel Quan and Daniel Vincent).
  47. Coarse Matching, Econometrica, vol. 70, issue 5, pages 2025-2034.
  48. Equilibrium Price Dispersion with Consumer Inventories, Journal of Economic Theory, 105 n.2, August 2002, 503-17. (with Pilky Hong and Ashish Nayyar).
  49. Measuring Anticompetitive Effects of Mergers When Buyer Power is Concentrated, Texas Law Review, (2001) vol. 79, no. 6, pp. 1621-1639 (with Kenneth Hendricks, Joshua M. Fried, Melanie Stallings Williams and Michael Williams).
  50. Collusive Bidding in the Market for Corporate Control, Nebraska Law Review, (2000) vol. 79, no. 1, pp. 48-74 (with Joshua M. Fried, Melanie Stallings Williams and Michael Williams).
  51. The Effects of Vertical Integration on Competing Input Suppliers, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland Economic Review 35, no. 1, Quarter 1, 1999.
  52. Auctioning Entry into Tournaments, Journal of Political Economy, 107, no. 3, June, 1999, 573-605 (with Richard Fullerton).
  53. Tarrifying Auctions, Rand Journal of Economics, 30, no. 1, Spring, 1999 (with Daniel Vincent and Wendy Takacs).
  54. Pretrial Negotiation, Litigation, and Procedural Rules, Economic Inquiry, 38: 218-238 (with Jiong Gong).
  55. Four Issues in Market Design, Revista Analisis Economico 13, no. 1, Junio de 1998, 7-24.
  56. Synergies in Wireless Telephony: Evidence from the MTA Auction, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 6, no. 10, Fall 1997, 497-527 (with Lawrence Ausubel, Peter Cramton, and John McMillan).
  57. Sequentially Optimal Auctions, Games and Economic Behavior 18, 246-76 (with Daniel Vincent).
  58. Competition and Game Theory, Journal of Marketing Research 33, August 1996, 263-7 (with John McMillan).
  59. Analyzing the Airwaves Auction, Journal of Economic Perspectives 10, no.1, Winter 1996, 159-75 (with John McMillan).
  60. The Evolutionary Stability of Auctions over Bargaining, Games and Economic Behavior, 15, 1996, 228-254 (with Xiaohua Lu).
  61. Damaged Goods, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 5, no. 2, Summer, 1996, 149-74 (with Ray Deneckere).
  62. Organizational Diseconomies of Scale, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 4, no. 3, Fall 1995, 399-26. (with John McMillan).
  63. Multiproduct Equilibrium Price Dispersion, Journal of Economic Theory 67, no. 1, October, 1995, 83-105.
  64. The Non-existence of Pairwise Proof Equilibrium, Economics Letters 49, 1995, 251-9 (with Marius Schwartz).
  65. Opportunism in Multilateral Vertical Contracting: Nondiscrimination, Exclusivity and Uniformity, American Economic Review 84, no. 1, March 1994, 210-30 (with Marius Schwartz).
  66. Endogenous Availability, Cartels and Merger in an Equilibrium Price Dispersion, Journal of Economic Theory 62, no. 1, February 1994, 24-47.
  67. Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers, Econometrica 61, no. 6, November 1993, 1281-1312.
  68. Collusive Bidding in Hostile Takeovers, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Winter 1993, 449-482, (with Dan Vincent, Mike Williams and Melanie Havens).
  69. The Price Decline Anomaly, Journal of Economic Theory 60, June, 1993, 191-212 (with Daniel Vincent).
  70. Horizontal Mergers in Spatially Differentiated Noncooperative Markets Journal of Industrial Economics XL, December 1992, 349-57 (with Joseph Simons and Michael Williams).
  71. Updating the Reserve Price in Common Value Auctions, American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, May 1992, 512-8 (with Daniel Vincent).
  72. New U.S. Merger Enforcement Guidelines: Competitive Effects, International Merger Law Events and Commentary 21, May 1992, 6-9 (with Joseph Simons and Michael Williams).
  73. Industrial Blackmail: Dynamic Tax Competition and Public Investment, Canadian Journal of Economics XXVI, no. 3, August 1993, 590-608 (with Ian King and Linda Welling).
  74. Investment Decisions under First and Second Price Auctions, Economic Letters, 1992, 289-93 (with Ian King and Linda Welling).
  75. Animal Spirits American Economic Review 82, no.3, June 1992, 493-507 (with Peter Howitt).
  76. Bidding Rings, American Economic Review 82, no.3, June 1992, 579-99 (with John McMillan).
  77. Amicable Divorce: Dissolving a Partnership with Simple Mechanisms, Journal of Economic Theory 56, no.2, April 1992, 266-93.
  78. A Dominant Strategy Double Auction, Journal of Economic Theory 56, no.2, April 1992, 434-50.
  79. Horizontal Mergers and Antitrust Policy, Journal of Industrial Economics XL, June 1992, 181-7 (with Michael Williams).
  80. Correlated Information and Mechanism Design, Econometrica 60, No. 2, March 1992, 395-421 (with Philip Reny).
  81. A Stone-Weierstrass Theorem without Closure under Suprema, Proceedings of the American Mathematical Society 114, Number 1, January 1992, 61-67 (with Philip Reny).
  82. Recent Developments in Economic Theory Regarding the Competitive Effects of Horizontal Mergers, International Merger Law (with Michael Williams), December, 1992.
  83. On What Economic Grounds should Horizontal Mergers be Challenged?, International Merger Law (with Michael Williams), no. 7, March 1991.
  84. Optimal Contracts for Teams, International Economic Review 32, no.3, August 1991: 561-77 (with John McMillan).
  85. Efficient Allocation with Continuous Quantities, Journal of Economic Theory 53, no. 1, February 1991: 51-74.
  86. Externalities and Asymmetric Information, Quarterly Journal of Economics CVI, no. 1, February 1991: 103-121 (with Jeremy Greenwood).
  87. Extracting the Surplus in Common Value Auctions, Econometrica 57, no.6, November, 1989: 1451-9, (with John McMillan and Philip Reny).
  88. The Department of Justice Merger Guidelines: A Critique and a Proposed Improvement, Pepperdine Law Review 6, no.4, 1989 (with Michael Williams).
  89. Government Procurement and International Trade, Journal of International Economics 26, 1989: 291-308 (with John McMillan).
  90. Commodity Bundling by a Monopolist, Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 1989, 371-83 (with John McMillan and Michael Whinston).
  91. Multidimensional Incentive Compatibility and Mechanism Design, Journal of Economic Theory 46, December 1988: 335-54 (with John McMillan).
  92. Stability of Equilibria with Aggregate Externalities, Quarterly Journal of Economics 103, May 1988: 261-77 (with Peter Howitt).
  93. Search Mechanisms, Journal of Economic Theory 44, February 1988: 99-123 (with John McMillan).
  94. Can Event Studies Detect Anticompetitive Mergers?, Economic Letters 28, 1988: 199-203 (with Michael Williams).
  95. Auctions with a Stochastic Number of Bidders, Journal of Economic Theory 43, October 1987: 1-19 (with John McMillan).
  96. Competition For Agency Contracts, Rand Journal of Economics, Summer 1987 (with John McMillan).
  97. Auctions with Entry, Economics Letters 23, 1987: 343-7 (with John McMillan).
  98. Auctions and Bidding, Journal of Economic Literature, 25, no. 2, (June 1987) 699-738 (with John McMillan).
  99. Nonlinear Contracts, Zero Profits and Moral Hazard, Economica 54, February 1987: 97-102 (with Raymond Fishe).
  100. Costly Search and Recruiting, International Economic Review 28, February 1987: 89-107 (with Peter Howitt).
  101. Bidding for Contracts: A Principal-Agent Analysis, Rand Journal of Economics, Autumn 1986 (with John McMillan)
  102. Sequential Procurement Auctions, Journal of Public Economics 31, 1986: 181-95 (with Richard Luton).
  103. Optimal Tenure and the Timing of Faculty Meetings, Studies in Economic Analysis 10, 1986.
  104. Unemployment Insurance and the Entitlement Effect: A Tax Incidence Approach, International Economic Review 27, February 1986 (with John Barron and Paul Speaker).
  105. Joint Search for Several Goods, Journal of Economic Theory 32, April 1984 (with John Carlson).
  106. American Economic Growth and the Voyage of Columbus, American Economic Review, September 1983.
  107. Discrete Equilibrium Price Dispersion, Journal of Political Economy, June 1983 (with John Carlson).
  108. On the use of Bonus Payments in an Experimental Study of Electricity Demand, Review of Economics and Statistics LXV, no.3, August 1983: 506-11 (with Raymond Fishe).
  109. Optimal Design of a Decision Support System, International Journal of Policy Analysis and Information Systems 6, 1982 (with Andrew Whinston).
  110. An OIS Model for Internal Control Evaluation, ACM Transactions on Office Information Systems, ACM-SIGOA, November 1982 (with Andrew Bailey, James Gerlach and Andrew Whinston).
  111. An Application of Complexity Theory to the Analysis of Internal Control, Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory, Summer 1981: 38-52 (with Andrew Bailey and Andrew Whinston).
  112. Internal Accounting Controls in the Office of the Future, IEEE Computer Journal, May 1981 (with Andrew Bailey, James Gerlach and Andrew Whinston).
  113. Formal Analysis of Internal Control-An Introduction The Proceedings of the First European Workshop on Information Systems, Aix-en-Provence,1981 (with Andrew Bailey, James Gerlach and Andrew Whinston).
  114. A Formal Model of Problem Solving, International Journal of Policy Analysis and Information Systems 4, 1980 (with Andrew Whinston).

The Price is Right Mysterious, Engineering and Science, 3, 2005.
Pricing Damaged Goods, Economics - The Open Access, Open Assessment E-Journal, Kiel Institute, 2007-1.

Introduction to Economic Analysis: a free, open source microeconomics text. See
Competitive Solutions: A Strategist's Toolkit, Princeton University Press, January, 2003.
Incentives in Government Contracting, with John McMillan, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, December, 1988.


  1. Auctions and Bid Rigging, Oxford Handbook on International Antitrust Economics, to appear, with Ken Hendricks and Mike Williams.
  2. The Greatest Auction in History, prepared for Better Living Through Economics, ed: John Siegfried, Harvard University Press, 2009.
  3. Oracle’s Acquisition of PeopleSoft: U.S. v. Oracle, prepared for the Antitrust Revolution, Fifth Edition ed: Lawrence White, with David Sibley and Michael Williams.
  4. Price Discrimination, ABA's Issues in Competition Law and Policy, Chicago: ABA Section of Antitrust Law, 2008, 465-84.
  5. Dynamic Pricing in the Airline Industry Handbook on Economics and Information Systems, Ed: T.J. Hendershott, Elsevier Handbooks in Information Systems, Volume 1; ISBN 0444517715, 2007 (with Vera te Velde).
  6. Private Antitrust Litigation: Procompetitive or Anticompetitive?, The Political Economy of Antitrust, Ch. 17, Edited by Vivek Ghosal and Johan Stennek, Elsevier North-Holland, ISBN-10: 0-444-53093-2, March 2007. (with Hugo Mialon and Sue Mialon)
  7. Evolution of the Market for Air Travel Information, Advances in Applied Microeconomics Volume 12: Organizing the New Industrial Economy, Ed: Michael Baye, (with Michael Doane and Ken Hendricks)
  8. Production Capacity for Durable Goods, in Business Modeling: Multidisciplinary Approaches - Economics, Operational and Information System Perspectives (in Honor of Andrew Whinston), Ed: Clyde Holsapple, Varghese Jacob and H. Raghav Rao, London: Kluewer Academic Publishers, 2002, 55-76.
  9. Matching and Expectations in a Market with Heterogeneous Agents, Advances in Applied Micro-Economics, Volume 6, ed: Michael Baye, Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, (with Xiaohua Lu).
  10. Convergence to Efficiency in Double Auctions, Advances in Applied Micro-Economics, Volume 6, ed: Michael Baye, Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, (with Jiong Gong).
  11. Electronic Markets, Readings in Electronic Commerce, Ed: Ravi Kalakota and Andrew B. Whinston, Addison-Wesley, 1997 (with John McMillan).
  12. Modelling Transactions under Asymmetric Information, Recent Developments in Game Theory, Eds: J. Creedy, J. Eichberger, and J. Borland, London: Edward Elgar, 1991 (with John McMillan).
  13. Ticom II - The Internal Control Language - An Introduction, Internal Control and the Impact of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, ed: Abdel-Khalik, Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1982 (with Andrew Bailey, James Gerlach and Andrew Whinston).
  14. Office Automation, Handbook of Industrial Engineering, New York: Wiley and Sons, 1982 (with Andrew Bailey, James Gerlach and Andrew Whinston).

Patent 6,718,312, with Paul Milgrom
Patent 7,689,627
Patent 7,747,680, with Ravi Kumar and Andrew Tomkins
Patent 7,962,851, with Ravi Kumar and Andrew Tomkins
Patent 8,156,032, with Chi Chao Chang, Darshan Kantak, and Sai-Ming (Eliot) Li.
Patent 8,174,974, with John Langford and Kishore Papineni.
Patent 8,538,809, with Darshan Kantak, Eliot Li, Michael Schwarz, and Jack Xie.


Pricing Lectures (Draft Course)
Competitive Solutions Minicourse 2005
Lectures on Vertical Integration Given to the FCC, 2003
Pricing Lectures Given in Amsterdam at NAKE, 2001
Auction Design for the Real World, 1995
Mathematics for economics, 1986

Notes from the EC 13 Program Chairs, ACM Special Interest Group on Electronic Commerce(SIGecom) Exchanges 12, no. 1, June, 2013.
Baffling Raffling Debaffled, ACM Special Interest Group on Electronic Commerce(SIGecom) Exchanges 10, no. 3, 2011.
Public Networks and Economic Growth.
Guardian Interview
Why are Prices so Bizarre?, video of a general interest talk May 3, 2006.
Sept 2005 Nightline Interview
Publicity Photo
2002 Senate Testimony (Windows Media Format, 40MB)
1993 FCC Filings
Chili Recipe
What is Pr{z>20}?
The Cookie Caper
Barriers to Entry - First Draft of Long Version (with Hugo Mialon and Michael Williams)
The Continuing War of Attrition, 2000 version
Deterring Bid Rigging in Forest Service Timber Auctions (Draft of 1988)
Nature of Risk Aversion (Draft of 1984)
Effective Computability and Economic Decisions (Draft of 1984)